THOMAS PICKERING (FORMER U.S UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE) - 4 October 2009
GEORGE NEGUS: Ambassador, it's good to talk to you. I was
wondering -
as a veteran Iran watcher, which is probably an appropriate way to
describe you, how did you come away from this week's attempts to get
together with the Iranians and actually get towards a resolution of
this problem of their nuclear resources, etc? Do you agree or disagree
that we are jumping at shadows here?
THOMAS PICKERING, FORMER U.S UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE: No, I don't
minimise this at all. I think that after the Natanz facility was
discovered some years ago and the IAEA and director-general Mohamed El
Baradei went to them and said, "You've got to let us know when you
start building things" and they didn't let us know when they started
building things So it's, in a sense, a political issue where trust in
Iran has once again been severely diminished by its behaviour at hiding
things when it otherwise should have let us know, particularly if it's
committed to a peaceful, civil nuclear program.
GEORGE NEGUS: That being the case, is President Ahmadinejad
believable?
Can he be 'trusted', as it were - whatever pejorative we choose to use.
Is it likely that he could go along with something as he seems to have
done this week and then shift his ground immediately afterwards or down
the track before the next gathering?
THOMAS PICKERING: George, when you're as old as I am and you have seen
as many of these people as I do, you adopt President Reagan's old motto
"trust but verify".
GEORGE NEGUS: Right! So what will verify that he's legitimate?
What
will verify that he's really attempting to reach a peaceful resolution
that means he doesn't have nuclear weapons?
THOMAS PICKERING: It's a critically important question and for a long
time I've felt that we need to put a heavy emphasis on the ability of
the IAEA to inspect what goes on in Iran - even if through our
intelligence sources unilaterally we find out what's going on, we need
to have some group that's technically competent that can go in there
and take a look at what's going on and tell us, "Yes, this is
completely in accord with their obligations," or "No, it's not," or
"We'll watch it." But they also need to be able to go where in fact
things aren't signalled but where they have suspicions so that we can
be sure that we have the best and most adequate inspection system
available. As you may know, I for one have written - with some friends
- that we would be prepared to allow Iran to enrich for civil purposes
only under multinational supervision to get that kind of inspection
system.
GEORGE NEGUS: What you're just saying then seems a little bit
de ja vu.
It's almost like the sort of language that we were using about weapons
of mass destruction and Saddam Hussein a few years back.
THOMAS PICKERING: You remember that for weapons of mass destruction,
for Saddam Hussein, a lot of people in my home town here in Washington
didn't believe the head of the UN inspection system, Hans Blix, when he
said, "We think we pretty well have it right "and he doesn't have
weapons." We went ahead and invaded anyway. In effect, all I'm saying
is that we need the best inspection system we get. We ought to have it
there. We ought to have the Iranians committed to every possible
firewall against making nuclear weapons and let's see if we can do that
through the diplomatic track. It's too early to call this in any
positive direction yet.
GEORGE NEGUS: You would maintain that sanctions and threats
are not the
way to go in this situation, particularly dealing with a curious
customer like Ahmadinejad?
THOMAS PICKERING: I don't believe, in fact, believe that sanctions and
threats ought to precede negotiations, but I would be the last to say
that we should drop them if, in fact, negotiations aren't proceeding in
good faith or that reasonable fair, forthcoming proposals being made
they are not discussed, negotiated and hopefully accepted. So I think
that's where we ought to save the muscle for.
GEORGE NEGUS: You have been involved, as I understand it, for
a couple
of years in so-called secret back channel talks with the Iranians about
this entire issue. Do they have a nuclear weapon? If they don't, are
they capable of producing a nuclear weapon? And if so, when?
THOMAS PICKERING: I think the answers are 'no', 'yes', and "only if we
don't work hard to stop 'em". They don't have a nuclear weapon, I don't
believe. They are capable of making a nuclear weapon. I think that
diplomacy and pressures and all the other things - getting the world
community together to say "This shall not happen," - is the best
possible way to move ahead. I don't believe going to war against them
is necessarily a very viable, very, very attractive opportunity at the
present time. The United States is already involved in two wars in the
Middle East. A third one is not something that I would advise lightly
to undertake and unfortunately Iran's capacity to be retributive in
that respect is pretty large. I think diplomacy's gotten started - we
need to give it a chance.
GEORGE NEGUS: You might say that about America and a lot of
other
powers but the Israelis are making no secret of the fact that they will
reserve the right to actually take out anything they think might even
vaguely resemble a reactor. If outright war with the Iranians is
unimaginable, as you put it, what do we do about the Israelis - who are
not part of the non-proliferation treaty and, ironically, the Iranians
are?
THOMAS PICKERING: It doesn't fit in very easily. I was ambassador to
Israel for almost four years and I understand the deep sense of concern
and indeed some of anguish that people in Israel feel about their
situation. On the other hand, we just had the Israeli Prime Minister
here. I think, reluctantly, but he did say in fact that he wanted to
see whether the US President could produce a result diplomatically.
President Obama has been committed to try to do that - I think not with
some starry eyed vision that everything would fall in to place once you
began to talk but with the notion that this was an alternative that had
to be fully explored and it was certainly worth trying here.
GEORGE NEGUS: Benjamin Netanyahu, of course, doesn't mess
about when it
comes to saying what he feels about these things. He says about Iran
"You don't want a messianic, apocalyptic cult "controlling atomic
bombs. "People say Iran will behave like any other nuclear power. "Can
we take that risk? Can we assume that?" How do you respond to that very
aggressive stance from the Israeli Prime Minister?
THOMAS PICKERING: I respond to that by saying that President Obama -
and indeed, I hope, the rest of the world - is committed to doing
everything possible not to seeing another country, like Iran, come on
the scene with nuclear weapons. It is the firmest, best and strongest
argument I've heard in favour of non-proliferation and that's the
argument that I think should impel us forward to continue to do what
we're trying to do, which is to make sure that in fact everything that
Iran does is completely consistent with the obligations they have
assumed in the non-proliferation treaty - in which they keep repeating
- and that nothing they do takes over that line, that red line into the
military programs. The US has been saying for a number of years that
Iran will have a potential for making nuclear weapons somewhere around
2014. I think we need to use that time constructively to see if in fact
that never happens.
GEORGE NEGUS: Would it help if the Israelis did sign the
Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty?
THOMAS PICKERING: Well, I think the Israelis have specifically and very
carefully maintained their ambiguity. If they were to sign the treaty
and if they really have military nuclear weapons programs, they would,
of course, have to give them up - because the treaty is a solemn
promise not to have those kinds of programs. I don't think that that's
a real possibility. We are all adults are about this. If the Israelis
have nuclear weapons they certainly haven't threatened to use them
against anybody. But at this stage I would not think that would add to
the process. The Israelis have traditionally, for years - whether they
still mean it, or not, remains an open question, but I hope they do -
have said that they are prepared to contemplate a nuclear-weapons-free
zone in the Middle East once they can find an answer to the problems
they have with the Arab world about their continued existence in the
region, and I would presume, obviously, that would require the creation
of a Palestinian state as well.
GEORGE NEGUS: You mention the Arab states. A lot of them would
say, "Is
it possible "that the world now has 'good' possessors of nuclear
weapons "and potential possessors of nuclear weapons "and 'bad' ones
"and it's OK for some people - "like the US, etc, etc, and Israel, if
they do have one - "OK for them to have nuclear weapons but not OK for
us?"
THOMAS PICKERING: Well as you know, the central bargain of the
non-proliferation treaty is that the states that have the weapons that
are recognised in the treaty are committed to doing away with those
weapons and the states that don't have weapons in return are committed
not to acquire them. That's the central bargain and, obviously, Iran
has committed not to acquire them. We need to do everything because a
lot of signs indicate that they aren't keeping faith with that
commitment, we need to do everything to get them back on the rails.
GEORGE NEGUS: You seem to be suggesting that this is linked to
the
whole resolution of the Israel and Palestine conflict. Are these two
things meshing - if we solve one, we solve the other, as it were?
THOMAS PICKERING: George, I think the truth is tougher and harsher than
that. The truth is if we can make progress in the Arab-Israeli peace
arrangements it will help, but I don't believe anybody believes that
the tooth fairy has arrived and if you solve one everything else will
be resolved.
GEORGE NEGUS: Well, it's good to talk to you. As an outsider,
I have to
say that your experience and wisdom in these matters is invaluable to
the rest of us. Thanks very much for your time.
THOMAS PICKERING: All the best to you and your audience.